Vill, she asked the then-Governor about the state of her home, and the then-Governor responded by taking her hand and kissing her on both cheeks, without her consent.
Vill said that, as the group was walking out of the house, the then- Governor turned around and told Ms. Vill she was beautiful. Vill stated that she felt uncomfortable and stayed behind at the front of her home as the then-Governor and his staff toured the damage on the side of her home. Vill, when the group returned, the then-Governor approached her, asked if there was anything else she wanted, and then leaned down and kissed her again — also without consent — while grabbing her hand.
Vill, after the visit, she received a voicemail from someone in the Executive Chamber inviting her to attend an event at which the then- Governor would be present. Vill said that none of her family members, nor any neighbor who had met the then-Governor during the same visit, received an invitation to the event. The former Governor has challenged the allegations of these twelve women in numerous ways — ranging from attacking the credibility of several of the women, to taking issue with whether his conduct toward others meets the legal definition of sexual harassment.
First, we address the legal standard for sexual harassment under New York State law. Until October , when new sexual harassment legislation was enacted, a plaintiff alleging a claim of hostile work environment created by sexual harassment under New York State law had to show that the alleged conduct was: 1 objectively severe or pervasive; 2 subjectively harassing; and 3 motivated by discriminatory animus.
In his deposition with the NYAG, the former Governor acknowledged that, as the former Attorney General of the State of New York, he was aware of the law regarding sexual harassment, and he stated that he understood certain core tenets of sexual harassment law. For example, former Governor Cuomo stated that he understood that:. The former Governor has also raised a number of factual arguments in response to the allegations that have been made against him.
He has claimed, for example, that certain of the women had credibility issues, motives to fabricate allegations, or were seeking publicity or personal gain. We highlight two examples here, which — standing alone — demonstrate that the former Governor engaged in sexual harassment, both under the former New York State law, which required conduct to be severe or pervasive, and under the more recent, less stringent sexual harassment law signed by the former Governor.
Trooper 1 stated that the former Governor engaged in the following conduct:. Trooper 1 held open a door to a building, which was away from the public area of the event, in that secure area for the then-Governor. As the then-Governor walked by Trooper 1, he ran the palm of his left hand across her stomach, with the center of his hand on her belly button and pushing back to her right hip, where her gun was holstered. Former Governor Cuomo has not himself publicly denied that he engaged in the conduct described by Trooper 1.
I did not mean any sexual connotation. I did not mean any intimacy by it. These post hoc arguments are unpersuasive. Commisso described in detail an escalating pattern of conduct by the then-Governor that involved suggestive comments and inappropriate touching, including on her breast and buttocks.
Commisso, the former Governor engaged in the following conduct toward her:. Commisso felt the then-Governor begin rubbing her buttocks. Commisso to send the photo to Alyssa McGrath, which Ms. Commisso did. Commisso was summoned to the Executive Mansion for a brief assignment.
Commisso again, pulled her close, and reached under her blouse and groped her breast over her bra. Having recently been groped by the then-Governor, Ms. Commisso said she felt like a liability. Commisso answered. Commisso recalled that during their brief exchange, the then-Governor asked her what she thought about the allegations against him.
Commisso was intimidated by the former Governor, did not want to disagree with or upset him, and wanted to keep her job. Commisso explained that she liked her job and when she initially began to be called upon to help the then-Governor, she felt proud and trusted, and she believed she was advancing in her career. Commisso said that when the then-Governor began making sexually suggestive comments and advances, she felt taken advantage of.
Commisso described the incident in which the then-Governor groped her as surreal; she felt terrified that someone would see the interaction and lose respect for her, or that she would lose her job.
Commisso said that after the then-Governor groped her, she believed that she would not call anyone, tell her supervisor, or file a complaint. Multiple Executive Chamber employees stated that in the wake of Charlotte Bennett coming forward publicly in March with allegations against the then-Governor, Ms. Bennett described. Commisso reported to her co- workers included describing how the then-Governor hugged her, touched her, turned his head and kissed her, placed his hand on her buttocks, and groped her breast.
Commisso because she was so upset. Though Ms. The former Governor has denied that he groped Ms. Commisso, touched her buttocks, or otherwise sexually harassed her. Commisso is lying.
Commisso has never said definitively that the incident occurred on that date. Contrary to the assertions by counsel for the former Governor, in her on-the- record interview with the NYAG and in her interviews, Ms. Commisso has consistently made clear that she did not remember the exact date of the incident.
Commisso did recall the following specific details regarding the date on which the then-Governor groped her:. Commisso was called to the Executive Mansion by Stephanie Benton on a weekday afternoon. Benton said that the then-Governor needed help with his iPhone. Commisso arrived at the Executive Mansion, the then- Governor asked her to copy text from an application on his iPhone, and to send it via text message to Ms. Commisso recalled calling Ms.
Benton after sending the text to confirm that Ms. Benton had received it. Commisso spent only approximately ten to fifteen minutes at the Executive Mansion on this occasion. Commisso returned to the Executive Chamber to continue her work day after she left the Executive Mansion.
The evidence that Davis Polk subsequently obtained establishes that the events above occurred on December 7, Specifically, the evidence shows that:. Eastern time, then-Governor Cuomo, along with two of his family members and a senior Executive Chamber employee, left the Executive Mansion en route to the Albany helipad at Exit Eastern time.
The briefing was televised. Eastern time and p. Eastern time, Ms. Benton called Ms. Commisso arrived at the Executive Mansion at p. Eastern time, a call was placed from Ms. Commisso departed the Executive Mansion at p.
Commisso swiped back in to the State Capitol building at p. The contemporaneous evidence collected establishes that the date Ms. Commisso described to us was December 7, This same evidence corroborates Ms.
That Ms. Commisso independently recalled such specific details as what the then-Governor was wearing, that he had been traveling, her call to Ms. Benton, and how much time she spent in the Executive Mansion on that occasion indicates that an out-of-the-ordinary incident occurred on that date, and further corroborates Ms.
Recently, after the former Governor learned that a date in December had been identified as the correct date of the groping incident, he began making additional arguments, including that Ms. Commisso corrected that description during the very same interview with the NYAG, stating that the then- Governor groped her breast after slamming the door — a statement consistent with those Ms.
We have also reviewed the transcripts and memoranda reflecting the recollections of the Executive Assistants in whom Ms. Commisso confided regarding the then-. We have not identified any material inconsistencies between or among these various descriptions. The types of minor inconsistencies we have observed do not indicate that Ms. Commisso is lying, or that the Executive Assistants are lying or were lied to by Ms. The former Governor has likewise attempted to sully Ms.
Because the former Governor has claimed that certain of the women had motives to fabricate allegations, or were seeking publicity or personal gain, we also find compelling that it was Ms. Commisso was not planning to come forward due to her fear of retaliation by the then- Governor.
The former Governor has also contended that he would never have groped Ms. Boylan had not made any allegations of sexual harassment against the former Governor. Boylan first made allegations of sexual harassment against the then-Governor.
Boylan, several senior members of the Executive Chamber took a number of actions in an attempt to discredit her, including the public release of portions of her employment file — documents that, it is worth noting, are not relevant to the issue of whether the former Governor sexually harassed Ms. Commisso has indicated that her fear of retaliation was based, in part, on this treatment of Ms. The former Governor has argued that the disclosure of portions of Ms.
Boylan, and it had the predictable effect of discouraging Ms. Commisso from coming forward. As noted above, the allegations of Ms. Each of these. To be clear, in highlighting these examples, we do not intend in any way to diminish the allegations of the other ten women who have come forward or suggest that we do not find them to be credible. The Committee has provided relevant information from its investigation to law enforcement and will continue to cooperate with respect to any such investigation.
To begin, there is no dispute that the former Governor wrote a book in , during the pandemic which required an all-hands-on-deck government response. Junior staff members were asked by senior Executive Chamber officials to perform tasks that were related to the Book as part of their regular course of work.
These senior officials attended meetings with agents and publishers, transcribed and drafted portions of the Book, coordinated the production and promotion of the Book, and participated in working sessions to review and finalize the Book. One senior Chamber official in particular spent significant time working on the Book, including during normal work hours, and served as the key point person between former Governor Cuomo and the publisher throughout the entire process.
That senior official sent or received over 1, emails regarding the Book, from July to December Another senior official sent or received over emails regarding the Book in the same time frame.
The evidence obtained demonstrates that senior officials, and the former Governor, worked on the Book during the course of normal work routines. The state official explained that Book-related assignments were given by superiors and were expected to be completed like any other task.
He further explained that the work was not voluntary, as he was never asked to volunteer and was not aware of other officials being asked to volunteer. Further, the state official was never told about any restrictions related to his work on the Book, from JCOPE or otherwise.
He explained that work on the Book differed from his prior work on political campaigns, where he would perform campaign work separate and apart from official state duties. In contrast, Book-related tasks were performed at times during the course of regular work hours and were not segregated in any way. Another senior state official stated in an interview that work done on the Book was voluntary, but contemporaneous evidence suggests that this state official felt otherwise at the time.
In August , this state official complained in a text message to a colleague that work on the Book was compromising his ability to work on other COVID-related matters. Further, whether the work on the Book by state officials was voluntary or not, the time and effort spent on the Book by both the then-Governor and other state officials necessarily detracted from their state duties during the intense period when the then- Governor, Executive Chamber employees and other state officials were continuously engaged in the pandemic response.
The then-Governor touted this period as requiring an around-the-clock government response. In his Book, for example, the former Governor. Former Governor Cuomo profited substantially from the Book, and he sought to downplay the money he earned from the Book.
Key senior officials also declined to cooperate with our investigation or otherwise make themselves available. As such, the former Governor was well-. A PRH representative reported that on the call, it was made clear to the then-Governor that he would be on a strict deadline to publish the Book before the presidential election, and that the then-Governor and senior Executive Chamber official assured PRH that they would meet the deadline. An auction process for the Book began on July 8, and involved three publishers.
The winning publishing house, PRH, prevailed on July 10, For example, during a radio appearance on. Specifically, he will write the book entirely on his own time, without the use of state resources or personnel. It will be written with the general public as its audience and will not identify the Governor as a State official on the cover of the book. No State agency will promote, advertise or otherwise endorse the book and the Governor will not do so while performing his State functions.
On July 13, , the Special Counsel emailed a Deputy General Counsel at JCOPE to confirm approval for the then-Governor to negotiate with the publisher, and to confirm approval of the full outside activity once certain additional information discussed was provided. On July 16, , the Special Counsel sent JCOPE a letter from PRH stating that the terms of the proposed contract with then-Governor Cuomo were usual and customary for the book publishing industry based on the surrounding facts and circumstances.
No State property, personnel or other resources may be utilized for activities associated with the book;. The book may not be written for an organization or audience which is regulated by, regularly negotiates with, or has contracts with any State agency;.
The book must identify the author in his personal capacity although a biography may cite his official State title ;. The Governor may not advertise, or otherwise promote or endorse, the book when he is performing his State duties;. Neither the Executive Chamber nor any State agency may use the book or make it available as part of any of its training programs; and.
The book must contain a disclaimer that the opinions and statements contained therein are those of the Governor only and do not represent those of any State agency.
Further, senior staffers themselves performed frequent work on the Book, including drafting and revising the Book in July and August We have gathered evidence that demonstrates that junior employees of the Executive Chamber were required to perform work on the Book on a non-voluntary basis. Certain senior Executive Chamber officials and Task Force members spent significant time working on the Book. This happened on multiple occasions and, according to the Task Force member, detracted from work on other pandemic issues — although the Task Force member said that much of his work on the Book was during nights and weekends.
The same senior Executive Chamber official served as the key point of contact for the Book, and sent and received at least 1, emails regarding the Book during the period from July to December while a variety of important COVID issues were. These communications included relaying requests from the then-Governor, providing draft sections of the Book, and handling administrative tasks with respect to the Book.
A Task Force member assisted in drafting and editing Chapter 6 of the Book, which touched on the issue of nursing homes during the pandemic. Contemporaneous emails and text messages indicate that two senior Executive Chamber officials made numerous requests to other senior staff members regarding the Book. These communications and this work occurred during the week and on the weekend, during work hours and after-hours.
In addition to their communications regarding the Book, senior members of the Chamber also attended at least three days of manuscript editing sessions at the Executive Mansion on Friday, July 24, , Saturday, July 25, , and Saturday, August 1, , and may have attended another meeting on Saturday, August 8, One senior state official stated that for at least some of the editing sessions, the attendees gathered in the dining room of the Executive Mansion to review printed copies of the manuscript.
Portions of the manuscript were read aloud, and attendees made comments and proposed edits to the manuscript. As part of our investigation, we reviewed timesheets of employees who worked on the Book. Because the timesheets show only whether a state employee recorded a full day of work on a particular day or took any leave that day, it is not possible to use the timesheets to account for how employees spent specific portions of their day.
One senior state official expressed the view that work on the Book was personal time and the official therefore took leave for certain days spent substantially working on the Book. There was no mention of any assistance by Executive Chamber officials or other state employees. The then-Governor also recorded an audio version of the Book.
Recording sessions took place in the Executive Mansion and were coordinated by members of the Executive Chamber. There were seven recording sessions at the Executive Mansion — each lasting multiple hours totaling approximately twenty-four hours — between Thursday, September 17, and Friday, September 25, The first recording session took place on Thursday, September 17, , starting in the late afternoon.
Beginning in late July and running through publication in October and beyond, members of the Executive Chamber also engaged in extensive correspondence with PRH and various other third parties regarding the marketing strategy, promotion, and sales of the Book.
Throughout, a senior Executive Chamber official continued to be the primary point of contact for PRH with regard to the Book. In addition, other members of the Executive Chamber, typically using personal email accounts, were also part of communications relating to Book interviews and other public relations efforts. Senior Executive Chamber staff also corresponded directly with the media regarding the Book, and were involved in dealing with certain high- profile supporters.
The key Executive Chamber official sent emails, oftentimes during the work week, related to asking public figures to attend events with the then-Governor to promote the Book.
As another example, one communication from Wednesday, October 7, reflects that an Executive Chamber employee spoke with representatives from a. Documents reflect numerous emails, phone calls, and text messages from Executive Chamber employees about Book sales. Then-Governor Cuomo was also involved in promoting the Book. His contract guaranteed he would be available for ten days of media and appearances related to the Book, and at least one such appearance was scheduled during a typical workday.
Our investigation evidences that the Book was the product of significant work performed by Executive Chamber staff during a time of a global pandemic requiring an around-the-clock response. The Committee has cooperated with law enforcement with respect to the evidence gathered in connection with its Book investigation, and will continue to do so.
We gathered evidence to assess whether the former Governor directed his staff to inappropriately withhold or misrepresent information regarding the effects of COVID on New Yorkers, particularly with respect to nursing homes in New York State.
We also examined whether the former Governor directed his staff to withhold information in response to requests in August from members of the New York State Legislature.
As noted, we did not conduct an independent medical review of the cause of nursing home infections and deaths during the pandemic and such a review was not within our mandate. The Executive Chamber also delayed providing information requested by the Legislature, contrary to the advice of a senior DOH official and another senior state official. Similarly, based on our investigation — which did not involve an independent medical assessment — we are not aware of any evidence that undermines the central conclusion of the DOH Report that COVID was likely introduced into nursing homes by infected staff.
We note that many of the decisions regarding the pandemic and related policies were made in the context of a once-in-a-century event that was fast- moving and presented significant challenges. As with other subjects addressed in this report, we note the ongoing law enforcement interest into nursing home issues, with which we have cooperated. We also interviewed several Executive Chamber officials on these topics, but two officials declined, and a third did not make themselves available despite repeated requests.
The former Governor and his counsel were given multiple opportunities to address the healthcare-related allegations under investigation. Finally, we are mindful of ongoing law enforcement interest regarding these issues, and we continue to cooperate accordingly.
The treatment of nursing home patients infected with COVID and the reporting of their deaths became an issue early on in the pandemic.
On March 25, , then-Governor Cuomo and DOH issued the March 25 Directive to nursing home administrators, directors of nursing, and hospital discharge planners. As always, standard precautions must be maintained, and environmental cleaning made a priority, during this public health emergency. The former Governor sought to rebut that criticism, including by directing DOH to produce a report defending the March 25 Directive. Following those discussions, a team of DOH employees was assigned to conduct a re-review of the nursing home data.
As discussed above, the former Governor began discussing a potential book deal with PRH and other book publishers during this same time period. A debate arose regarding whether to include a figure that included all deaths of nursing home facility residents approximately 10, deaths , or a lower figure that included only deaths that occurred within nursing home facilities approximately 6, deaths.
Prior to the issuance of the DOH Report, a draft scientific paper prepared by DOH medical officials had identified approximately 10, nursing home-related fatalities, a number which included both in-facility and out-of-facility deaths. In late June, members of the Executive Chamber and Task Force convened a call and discussed data in drafts of the DOH Report, including the approximately 10, deaths among nursing home residents.
Witnesses have stated that the same senior Executive Chamber official who served as the key point person for the Book made the decision that only in-facility deaths would be included in the DOH Report. Certain witnesses have explained that there are multiple possible reasons for choosing to report in-facility deaths only, including questions regarding the reliability of data regarding out-of-facility deaths, which was more difficult to collect and verify than data regarding in-facility deaths, other witnesses explained that a reason for including in-facility deaths only was because including the higher number would have distracted from the overall message of the DOH Report and would have also been inconsistent with data that had been publicly reported at the relevant time.
Throughout the drafting process, the former Governor reviewed and edited the draft DOH Report on multiple occasions, and made edits to strengthen the defense of the March 25 Directive. DOH officials who worked on the DOH Report expressed a number of concerns regarding drafts of the report, including that drafts of the report used data that could not be independently verified by DOH, and that drafts included statements of causality and drew oversimplified conclusions, and did not explain the limitations of the data used in the DOH Report.
There was only one healthcare professional on the Task Force, a senior DOH official, and that senior DOH official did not have regular meetings with the former Governor during the pandemic and found it difficult to speak directly with the former Governor, as senior Executive Chamber employees guarded access to the former Governor. During testimony before the New York State Senate in August , a senior Executive Chamber official, who was in the room where a senior DOH official was remotely testifying, wrote a message on a whiteboard suggesting that the senior DOH official testify in effect that the March 25 Directive was authored by DOH and that the Executive Chamber was not involved.
Around August , the same senior DOH official also prepared a letter to members of the Legislature reporting the full nursing home death numbers and provided it to the Executive Chamber for approval. After asking for additional time to respond to the requests for information, the Cuomo Administration provided information in response to the requests from New York State legislators on February 10, The evidence obtained in our investigation indicates that the former Governor and his senior staff were not fully transparent with the public regarding the number of COVID deaths among nursing home residents.
The Committee is cooperating with law enforcement with respect to these issues. The question of whether the Bridge is actually safe or fit for service was therefore outside the scope of the review.
Davis Polk also obtained access to a database maintained by TZC that contains additional records related to the Bridge construction project. In addition, Davis Polk made voluntary document requests and later subpoenaed materials from the Executive Chamber in connection with the Bridge investigation, but received little to no documents in response to these requests.
Below we have summarized certain relevant facts within the scope of the review, based on documents and other information obtained in the course of the investigation. Leading up to the opening of the first span in August , Executive Chamber and Thruway officials engaged in numerous discussions regarding the Bridge and construction status. Beginning in September , approximately one month after the first span of the Bridge opened, members of the Executive Chamber and Thruway exchanged emails regarding a draft press release.
Specifically, the press release announced that traffic that had previously used the old Tappan Zee Bridge had now shifted to the first span of the new Bridge. The Opening of the Second Span of the Bridge. The Executive Chamber and the Thruway also engaged in numerous discussions concerning the opening of the second span of the Bridge:.
There was no mention of bolt or safety issues in these communications. Although the Executive Chamber became aware of alleged deficiencies in the bolts used to construct the Bridge by no later than December , the Thruway repeatedly informed the Executive Chamber and announced publicly that the Bridge was safe and fit for use.
On December 13, , a news outlet reported that dozens of bolts used on the Bridge broke during construction and that workers allegedly tried to cover up the potential problem. On March 7, , the Albany Times Union published a report on the alleged bolt defects, noting that experts retained by the whistleblower believed the situation was likely to worsen as more bolts deteriorate and that critical testing had not been performed.
We have carefully examined voluminous evidence, including approximately , pages of documents and witness materials related to proffers, interviews, or depositions for more than individuals. We have also reviewed the statements made and writings by former Governor Cuomo and his counsel — opportunities of which they availed themselves despite, in the end, refusing to comply in any meaningful way with. As detailed throughout this report, we collected and reviewed evidence that former Governor Cuomo:.
As noted, we are mindful of the ongoing law enforcement interests into several of the matters covered in this report. We have prepared this report with those interests in mind and we are cooperating with any such investigations. Cuomo Tr. Carroll, N. Relative to Power of Impeachment, N. This interpretation, however, is not universally accepted. See, e. Exploring the Temporal Dimension of Impeachments, 95 Chi. Compare U. At the state level, the results are somewhat mixed.
Maddox, S. In other state cases, when a public official resigned, the impeachment proceedings ended or were held to be unlawful. See State v.
Hill, 55 N. Brantley, So. Charles D. Lavine, Sept. Bennett Tr. Boylan Tr. Boylan DPW Interview. Commisso Tr. Commisso DPW Interview. Liss Tr. McGrath Tr. Limmiatis Tr. Vill DPW Interview. Times, Aug. Cuomo Feb. Lavine, Oct. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N. Forklift Sys. United Parcel Serv. Kaisman, N.
New York Div. Barton Chevrolet Cadillac, No. William Paterson Coll. Quality Payroll Systems, Inc. Sovereign Motor Cars, Ltd. Postal Serv. Hyatt Corp. Glavin, Former Governor Andrew M. Representatives on the Democratic-controlled committee are expected to vote on the report Tuesday evening, and will send it to the House Judiciary Committee for the next stage of the impeachment inquiry if the report gets majority approval today.
House Republicans have already r eleased their own impeachment inquiry report rebuking the process led by Democrats, claiming that the evidence set out in their report "does not prove any of these Democrat allegations.
In a move portraying its confidence that the House Intelligence Committee will approve its report outlining evidence gathered in its impeachment investigation today, the House Judiciary Committee has already scheduled a hearing for 10 a. Wednesday morning. The panel announced Monday that four expert legal witnesses will appear before lawmakers on the committee to discuss the constitutional grounds for impeachment.
An invitation to participate in the House Judiciary Committee's Wednesday impeachment hearing was rejected by President Trump and White House legal counsel Pat Cipollone in a letter sent to panel chairman Rep. Jerrold Nadler on Sunday. Cipollone wrote: "We cannot fairly be expected to participate in a hearing while the witnesses are yet to be named and while it remains unclear whether the Judiciary Committee will afford the President a fair process through additional hearings.
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