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Although its tragic, it gives some circumspect. When one becomes almost an immortal, its tempting to become a god and kill men. You figure you are more that others and devalue your fellow human beings. The dancer knew this and decided to kill him and herself to save all. I think the movie should be a lot more clearer in its perspective. Reviewer: mars express - favorite favorite favorite favorite favorite - February 19, Subject: Horror Great Asian horror classic. Community Collections. Sano as Dr.
Minosuke Yamada Official as Official. More like this. Watch options. Storyline Edit. Can he be stopped before he kills again? Half Human! Half Beast! It Destroys! It Kills! Not Rated. Add content advisory. Did you know Edit. Alternate versions Although conceived as a literary and character driven story, the Japanese version, which contains footage not in the U. Section 3 introduces the methodology.
Section 5 presents the conclusions. This is also the second largest sector of the Spanish economy in terms of exports with The chemical sector employed , people in , a figure that has fallen to around , in recent years because of the economic crisis [17].
Compared with data published by the Ministry of Employment in , this index is lower than the industrial sector index 5. The severity index for the sector was 0. The disastrous accident at Seveso Italy in led to European Union legislation intended to prevent accidents in certain industries using hazardous substances and thus limit the impact on employees, the general population, and on the environment.
This regulatory framework established that a manufacturer company which used in their process hazardous substances listed in the Appendix A or stored hazardous substances listed in the Appendix B, or both, must develop among other documents interior and exterior protection and emergency plans that include risk assessment. During the implementation of Seveso I, there were more than serious accidents in Europe and new risks appeared due to technological advances.
In Spain, in , according to data from the Directorate General for Civil Defence [21], there were high risk plants subject to the Seveso directive and low risk plants. The geographical distribution is similar to that for turnover: Catalonia was first with high risk plants According to a study by Planas et al. The chemical industry has implemented improvements in process safety and environmental protection with four strategies: inherent safer design; risk assessment processes; use of instrumented safety systems; and the implementation of safety management systems.
Risk assessment is the process of identifying, analysing, and evaluating the hazard posed by an industrial plant and the main aim is the prevention and mitigation of accidents in potentially hazardous facilities [,27]. The phase of hazard identification is the process in which hazards are identified and recorded.
The analysis phase involves developing an understanding of the hazard and providing information for evaluation. The evaluation phase involves comparing the estimated hazard levels with predefined criteria to define the importance of the level of hazard and decide whether it is necessary to address the hazard—as well as the most appropriate strategies and methods of hazard treatment [8]. Choosing the appropriate risk assessment techniques is a difficult decision that will depend on factors such as the complexity of the problem, the methods for analysis of the amount of information available, the need for quantitative data, and available resources [28].
Often, authors combine some techniques with the purpose of blending, i. HAZOP is a qualitative technique that carries out a structured analysis of the process and allows identifying the deviations that may take place with regard to the intended functioning, as well as their causes and consequences. HAZOP does not try to provide quantitative results but, in many situations, it is necessary to rank the identified hazards, mainly to prioritize the actions to mitigate them because this decision depends of the risk level.
It can identify the potential causes and the ways of failure and can assess quantitatively the probability of development of the accident. The blending of the two techniques was defined as positive because minimize the uncertainty [29,30,31]. The methodology Figure 1 begins with a detailed study of the industrial process and substances used. Subsequently, an historical analysis of accidents is made—which is the study and analysis of accidents in similar plants to identify risk and causes.
This stage is performed by referring to specialised scientific publications and literature review. After the HAZOP sessions, the possible fault causes and consequences of the given deviations from the design are identified. These data allow, according to the criteria of the HAZOP team, identifying the initiating events, modelling the fault propagation process, and finally building the fault tree analysis. The HAZOP technique [36] is a structured and systematic examination of a product, process, or procedure—or an existing or planned system.
This is a qualitative technique based on the use of guide words Table 1 that question how design intent or operating conditions may fail to be achieved at each step of the design process or technique.
The guide words must always be appropriately selected to the process which is analysed and additional guide words can be used. This technique is applied by a multidisciplinary team during a series of meetings where work areas and operations are defined—and each of the variables that influence the process are applied to the guide to verify the operating conditions and detect design errors or potentially abnormal operating conditions Figure 2.
Causal effects are identified deductively and organised in a logical manner and shown using a tree diagram that describes the causal factors and their logical relationships Table 2 with respect to the top event. A fault tree can be used qualitatively to identify potential causes and the ways in which failure the top event occurs or quantitatively, or both, to calculate the probability of the top event from the probabilities of causal events. Construction of the fault tree: From the top event, the possible immediate causes of the failure modes are established and it is possible to identify how these failures can occur at basic levels or in basic events.
Qualitative evaluation: The aim to find the minimum set of faults, establishing a mathematical formulation from the relationships established in the fault tree. Boolean algebra is used. Quantitative evaluation: From the frequency of failure of basic events, the probable frequency of an accident is calculated if it occurs as well as the most critical fault routes i.
Quantitative evaluation enables a complete risk analysis before implementing and prioritising actions to improve the safety and reliability of the system under study. A complementary sensitivity analysis can be performed to check the effect of the basic events in the global risk assessment. These data allow prioritizing the preventive measures and the efforts of the risk control process. The application of the methodology is performed for the jetty and pipe work of the chemical terminal, as well as the connected storage facilities, at the Port of Valencia.
Both companies work in the reception, storage, loading, and distribution of liquid products—divided into two groups: chemicals and oil. TEPSA stores and distributes gasoline, diesel, methanol, and other chemicals in smaller amounts. Such high-risk plants are required to conduct a risk analysis. Chang et al. The main causes of tanks accidents were in order of importance: lightning Based on this work, Hailwood et al. They divided the LNG terminals in five areas: LNG tanks, unloading section from ship to tank , send-out section, condenser and outlet pipeline.
In tanks section, the main initiating events are boil-off removal malfunction during unloading or during storage , a high temperature in LNG when coming from ship , an excess of external heat in storage tank area, an overfilling of the tank, a rollover during unloading or during storage, an inadvertent starting of additional compressors, a continuation of uploading beyond lower safety level and an increase of send out rate from tank.
In unloading section, the main initiating events are an excess external heat in jetty area, a water hammer in loading arm due to inadvertent valve closure , an inadequate cooling of lading arm and high winds during uploading. In Appendix A, a list of well documented past accidents has been extracted from reports and works available in the literature.
The list includes accidents in petroleum and LNG product storage facilities [12,13,43,44]. The origins of these accidents were leaks or spills 9 , explosions 7 and fire 6. Leakage in the form of liquid is the most common source of major accidents—leading to fires and explosions that may cause other leaks, thus lengthening the accidental chain.
The possible consequences of leakage depend on the flammability and toxicity of the leaked liquids and the environmental conditions in which the leak occurs. Seventeen of the cases originated in storage tanks, two in tanker ships, one in pipes, one in a steam boiler of a LNG plant and in one case there was no specific origin.
Factors that may cause an accident are grouped into general and specific. Among the general causes are those that are: external to the plant, human behaviour, mechanical failure, failure caused by impact, violent reactions; instrumentation failure, and failure of services. These general causes include a number of specific causes provided by details of specific accidents. Note that a single accident can occur for more than one general cause, and a general cause may be the result of more than one specific cause.
The recorded data on the general causes of accidents shows that the cause was human behaviour in ten cases, instrumentation failure on four occasions, electrostatic spark on two occasions, mechanical failure in two occasions, unknown causes on two occasions, and two accidents were caused respectively by mechanical impact failure and external causes respectively. Ignition sources provided the energy needed for the combustion of a flammable mixture. These sources can be thermal, electrical, mechanical and chemical.
Data shows that in seven accidents the cause was electrical, in three the cause was welding during maintenance works, mechanical in three cases, thermal in two cases, and unknown in seven cases. The Valencian plant is divided into three systems Figure 3 that correspond to the three activities of the companies: unloading, storage, and loading for distribution.
These three systems are divided into six sub-systems and these again are divided into specific points or nodes that correspond to the sequence of operational steps in the plant Table 3. As a result of this analysis, it can be seen that, in the areas for loading and unloading liquid products Systems 1 and 3 , the greatest danger is the possibility of an uncontrolled spill.
The occurrence of this event is closely linked to the effectiveness of the staff responsible for handling the tasks. Relative to System 2, the risk of a fuel loss in the pipelines and leakage or fuel loss in the storage tanks is noteworthy. The latter event could be caused by overfilling or a partial rupture of the tank. Special attention must be given to such events because they can cause fires and explosions that may have more serious consequences for the plant and its staff.
These events or top events were:. The faults and relationships for each top event have been identified and a logical combination of incidents has been deduced that can trigger unwanted events. In this way, each tree contains information about how the combination of certain faults leads to overall failure Figure 4. Appendix B presents the fault trees of the other top events. Once the fault trees have been made, the mathematical expressions are defined ant the probability values are calculated according to the Boolean algebra related to FTA Table 6 and Table 7.
The procedure for calculating the top event 1 is shown in Table 7. In the four analysed top events, some 19 basic events are defined and fault frequencies were determined using data from the Spanish National Institute on Health and Safety at Work [45] and research on fuel storage [12,41,,47]. In the Appendix C similar tables are developed for the others top events.
In Table 8 , the results of failure frequency for each of the top events and their ways of failure are presented. If the basic events are analysed, the main causes for a connection leak are a bad hose connection and a response failure following the detection of an emergency incorrect staff response, failure of the acoustic alarm, or seizure of the manual closure valve.
This event occurs following a loss of product caused by a bad connection of the loading arm or damaged parts together with human error. The probability of occurrence is low since it is one of the most complex operations and involves very strict protocols. A sensitivity analysis has been performed see Appendix D in order to check the effect of the basic events in the global risk assessment.
In the top event 1 Table 9 and Figure 5 , the basics events with more influence in the sequence of the accident are in order of importance: operator distracted, operator failure, badly connecting loading arm and collision against jetty during manoeuvres.
In the top event 2 are corrosion, operator distracted and with the same importance vehicles collision and fatigue defect. In the top event 3 are operator failure and with equal importance the failure of the sensor level and the failure of response of the shut-off valve. In the top event 4 are hose incorrectly connected, after with equal importance, the acoustic signal failure and the sticking of the manual shut-off valve, and in the fourth level the operator failures.
These results show the importance in all the sequences of accident of the failure or distraction of the operators, so it should be mandatory a plan for training the staff of the plants.
Planning of the maintenance actions of the facility must take into account both the general results from the risk assessment and the results from the sensitivity analysis. HAZOP analysis identifies the risks and their possible causes and consequences. FTA, based on the HAZOP analysis, represents the fault propagation pathways and produces a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the sequences of events that can lead to accidents or serious failures. Results from FTA allow prioritizing the preventive and corrective measures in order to minimize the probability of failure.
An analysis of case study about a fuel storage terminal is performed. HAZOP analysis shows that loading and unloading areas are the most sensitive areas of the plant and where the most significant danger is a fuel spill—tasks that can produce such an event are closely supervised by staff.
Tasks related to transferring fuel from ships to tanks and storage tanks are the most automated and so the influence of personnel is reduced—although the consequences are more serious if an accident occurs. A sensitivity analysis of the FTA results shows the importance of the human behaviour in all sequences of the possible accidents.
In future research, we will apply a similar analysis to other type of plant, as LNG plants or storage of chemical products at a process plant, in order to improve the use of the combined method and to compare results from the risk assessments.
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